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afrIcan SyStemS
afrIcan commISSIon Set to reVIew 
dISSolutIon of SubregIonal trIbunal
The African Commission on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights (the Commission) 
agreed to hear a case brought by two 
Zimbabwean farmers, Luke Tembani and 
Ben Freeth, who allege that an August 
2012 decision by the Southern African 
Development Community (SADC) Summit 
of Heads of State or Government (SADC 
Summit) to dissolve the SADC Tribunal 
(Tribunal) violates the African Charter 
on Human and Peoples’ Rights (African 
Charter). The Commission’s opinion will 
determine whether, under the African 
Charter and international norms, any of 
the fifteen heads of state within the SADC 
Summit, each named as a respondent in 
the complaint, violated their obligations in 
their roles creating policy direction for the 
SADC. Thus before the case is even heard, 
it sets a new precedent for individuals to 
name multiple heads of state as respon-
dents before an international body.
After Zimbabwe refused to comply 
with a decision in Mike Campbell Ltd. and 
Others v. Zimbabwe, in which the Tribunal 
found in favor of farmers’ land rights, the 
SADC Summit suspended the Tribunal 
in 2010 to review its role. Although the 
SADC’s Committee of Ministers of Justice 
recommended reappointing and replacing 
the Tribunal judges, the SADC Summit 
decided in May 2011 to continue the 
suspension and, later in 2012, to perma-
nently dissolve the current Tribunal. The 
SADC Summit has asked the Ministers 
of Justice to write a new mandate for 
a SADC Tribunal that would only hear 
cases between States regarding the inter-
pretation of the SADC Treaty and SADC 
protocols. The previous Tribunal jurisdic-
tion also encompassed the ability to hear 
cases brought by individuals concerning 
violations of human rights. Freeth’s father 
and Tembani filed the complaint in Mike 
Campbell under the old mandate but have 
yet to receive compensation owed from 
the ruling because the Tribunal’s suspension 
also affected enforcement of previous 
decisions.
Concurrently, other interested parties 
in the region are also seeking to challenge 
the dissolution of the Tribunal. Two non-
governmental organizations, the Southern 
African Litigation Centre (SALC) and 
the Pan African Lawyers Union (PALU), 
submitted a request, under Article 4 of 
the Protocol to the African Charter on 
the Establishment of an African Court on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights (the Protocol) 
to the African Court on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights (the Court) for an advisory 
opinion regarding the legitimacy of the 
dissolution process. The NGOs make their 
claim under the African Charter, the SADC 
Tribunal Protocol, the SADC Treaty, the 
UN Principles on the Independence of the 
Judiciary, and the UN Basic Principles and 
Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and 
Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations 
of International Human Rights Law 
and Serious Violations of International 
Humanitarian Law. With these documents, 
the Court would decide if the actions 
taken by the SADC Summit violated the 
rights to justice, to effective remedies, and 
to an independent judiciary. Although an 
advisory opinion is not binding, the orga-
nizations hope that the SADC institutions 
will take into account an advisory opin-
ion issued by the Court since the SADC, 
as a subregional economic community 
(SEC), should make an effort to coordinate 
policies with the African Union (AU), a 
stated goal of the AU in Article 3 of its 
Constitutive Act. As stated in the SADC 
Treaty, the SADC means to take into 
account the AU Constitutive Act including 
the goals listed therein. However, the Court 
would likely delay stepping into the issue 
because under Article 4 of the Protocol, the 
Court is barred from issuing an advisory 
opinion if there is a case pending before 
the Commission regarding the same mat-
ter, such as the case brought by Tembani 
and Freeth.
If the petitioners are successful in either 
the case pending before the Commission or 
the request before the Court, the resulting 
opinion could potentially affect both the 
southern African region’s rule of law sys-
tem as well as the strength of SECs’ adju-
dicatory mechanisms across the African 
continent. In dissolving the Tribunal and 
denying any subsequent adjudicatory 
body a human rights mandate, the SADC 
Summit undermined the progress the fif-
teen Member States of SADC have made in 
developing an effective rule-of-law system 
and providing redress for individuals who 
otherwise depend on inadequate domestic 
courts. Supporting the SADC Tribunal 
would also help the Commission or the 
Court to show support for the other simi-
larly organized SEC tribunals in Africa, 
such as the Economic Community of West 
African States (ECOWAS) Community 
Court of Justice, thereby strengthening the 
rule of law in the region.
ecowaS communIty court 
of JuStIce holdS nIgerIan 
goVernment lIable for human 
rIghtS VIolatIonS by oIl comPanIeS
The Economic Community of West 
African States (ECOWAS) Community 
Court of Justice (ECCJ), in a recent opin-
ion, demanded that the Federal Republic 
of Nigeria protect its citizens’ right to 
an adequate environment favorable for 
development. The ECCJ’s judgment in 
SERAP v. The Federal Republic of Nigeria 
on December 14, 2012, ordered Nigeria 
to fix environmental damage in the Niger 
Delta, protect against further environmen-
tal damage, and hold the perpetrators of 
environmental damage accountable. The 
plaintiffs, Socio-Economic Rights and 
Accountability Project (SERAP), and the 
ECCJ’s opinion cite oil companies as the 
main perpetrators of environmental dam-
age in the Niger Delta. The opinion con-
nects the lack of enforcement of legislation 
and regulations against oil companies in 
Nigeria to degradation of the environment. 
SERAP originally named seven oil compa-
nies as defendants in the complaint, but the 
ECCJ ultimately found that it did not have 
jurisdiction over them. However, under this 
ruling, the ECCJ is requiring Nigeria to 
enforce environmental regulations against 
oil companies operating within Nigeria, 
such as the Shell Petroleum Development 
Company (Shell), thereby holding for-
eign companies liable for domestic human 
rights violations.
REGIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS SYSTEMS
1
West et al.: Regional Human Rights Systems
Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law, 2013
66
SERAP argued that international oil 
companies have created an inadequate 
standard of living through the pollution 
of food and water. Two oil spills in 2001 
and 2008 resulted in the contamination 
of local rivers and creeks in Ogbobo 
and Ogoniland from Shell-owned pipe-
lines. Local water supplies were contami-
nated, causing the depletion of edible fish, 
which the local community depends upon 
for adequate food. Additionally, SERAP 
argued that similar oil spills in the Niger 
Delta have destroyed crops and the quality 
of soil used in farming. As a result, poverty 
in the area has increased as people’s liveli-
hoods are destroyed. Therefore, SERAP 
argued that the Nigerian government and 
seven different oil companies violated the 
right to an adequate standard of living, as 
determined by adequate access to food, 
water, healthcare, and a clean environment.
Although SERAP alleged that Nigeria 
violated 29 articles from a variety of 
international human rights instruments, 
the ECCJ limited its judgment to Articles 
1 and 24 of the African Charter on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights (African Charter). 
Although Nigeria raised a preliminary chal-
lenge stating that the ECCJ could not rule 
on instruments outside of the treaties, con-
ventions, and protocols of ECOWAS, the 
Court found that it could rule on violations 
of other international instruments under 
Article 1(h) of the Protocol on Democracy 
and Good Governance (Protocol), which 
allows for outside international human 
rights instruments to govern the human 
rights obligations of ECOWAS Member 
States. However, the Court, determining 
that many of the articles cited by the 
plaintiffs were equivalent to each other, 
found it could cite the article that affords 
the best protection for the alleged viola-
tion. Therefore, the ECCJ focused on the 
right to an adequate environment (Article 
24) and States’ obligation to ensure rights 
(Article 1).
The ECCJ’s decision reinforced the 
duty of ECOWAS Member States to pro-
tect against environmental degradation by 
oil companies that results in an inadequate 
standard of living. Negative effects on 
the environment due to the operations 
of oil companies in the region has been 
an ongoing issue in Nigeria as well as a 
growing issue in other ECOWAS Member 
States. With this decision, the ECCJ has 
shown that it will hold Member States of 
ECOWAS to their obligations to protect 
the rights of citizens under Article 1 of 
the African Charter, including by enforc-
ing existing legislation — a step some 
Member States are reluctant to take against 
foreign companies. Furthermore, under 
the decision, ECOWAS Member States are 
responsible for the violations of human 
rights by international companies operat-
ing within the state. The Nigerian govern-
ment has a long history of permitting inter-
national oil companies to operate within 
its borders: Shell has operated in Nigeria 
since the 1930s. Therefore, the Nigerian 
government may lack the necessary incen-
tive to enforce the decision against oil 
companies. Additionally, Nigeria has yet 
to use its domestic implementation system 
for ECCJ decisions. If the Nigerian gov-
ernment chooses not to enforce the ECCJ’s 
ruling and hold oil companies liable, it 
will set a counter-precedent for ECOWAS 
Member States.
Brittany West, a J.D. candidate at the 
American University Washington College 
of Law, is a staff writer for the Human 
Rights Brief.
euroPean SyStem
ecthr reInStateS ukraInIan 
SuPreme court Judge
For the first time in its history, the 
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) 
ordered a Member State to reinstate a dis-
missed former judge. In its January 2013 
judgment for Oleksandr Volkov v. Ukraine, 
the ECtHR found that Ukraine violated 
Article 6 (right to fair trial) and Article 8 
(right to respect for private and family life) 
of the European Convention on Human 
Rights (ECHR) when the High Council 
of Justice dismissed Supreme Court 
Justice Oleksandr Volkov in May 2010 
due to an alleged “breach of oath.” The 
ECtHR ordered Ukraine to reinstate him 
as a Supreme Court judge immediately. 
Furthermore, in view of the serious sys-
tematic problems concerning the function-
ing of the Ukrainian judiciary, the Court, 
under Articles 41 (just satisfaction) and 46 
(binding force and execution of judgments), 
recommended that Ukraine immediately 
reform its system of judicial discipline.
Volkov became a Supreme Court judge 
in 2003. In December 2007, he was elected 
as a member of the High Council of 
Justice, but the Parliamentary Committee 
of the judiciary refused to allow him 
to take the oath of office or assume his 
duties. Two members of the High Council 
of Justice conducted preliminary inquiries 
in December 2008 and March 2009, look-
ing into possible misconduct by Volkov. 
According to the ECtHR, Volkov had failed 
to recuse himself in cases concerning fam-
ily members and had made, “gross proce-
dural violations.” However, Volkov did not 
have an opportunity to rebut these charges.
Following these inquiries, the President 
of the High Council of Justice submitted 
two applications to Parliament for Volkov’s 
dismissal. In June 2010, Parliament voted 
for Volkov’s dismissal for “breach of oath.” 
Volkov subsequently challenged his dis-
missal before the Higher Administrative 
Court (HAC), but that court found the 
High Council of Justice’s dismissal had 
been lawful and refused to re-consider.
In response to Volkov’s petition, the 
ECtHR found four separate violations of the 
Article 6 right to fair trial. First, the Court 
held that the judicial bodies that had consid-
ered Volkov’s case were neither independent 
nor impartial. The Court emphasized that 
there were “structural deficiencies in the 
proceedings before the High Council for 
Justice,” including clear indications that a 
number of members had personal biases 
against Volkov. The Court further found that 
Parliament’s hearing of the case increased 
the politicization of the judicial process 
and further inhibited the possibility of an 
independent judiciary and separation of 
powers. Furthermore, the review of the case 
by the Higher Administrative Court did not 
remedy these defects.
The ECtHR additionally found that 
Ukraine breached the principle of legal 
certainty by not limiting the period of 
review for the proceedings against Volkov. 
By violating fair voting practices through 
casting multiple ballots, the Court held 
that the Ukrainian parliament violated the 
Ukrainian Constitution and other legisla-
tion and therefore the principle of legal 
certainty. The ECtHR found a violation 
of the Article 8 right to privacy because 
the Court deemed Volkov’s dismissal to be 
inconsistent with domestic law as well an 
impermissible interference with his private 
and professional life. Because Ukraine had 
not established guidelines or normative 
practices establishing a consistent inter-
pretation of the notion of “breach of oath,” 
the procedure lacked adequate procedural 
safeguards to prevent arbitrary use.
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In conclusion, the Court found that the 
serious systemic problems resulted from 
the failure to organize the judicial branch 
to ensure sufficient separation of powers. 
The Court faulted the Ukrainian judi-
ciary system for not providing sufficient 
“guarantees against abuse and misuse of 
disciplinary measures,” and found that this 
failure undermines the entire Ukrainian 
democracy. To remedy these violations, 
the ECtHR ordered Ukraine to carry out 
reform of the judicial discipline system, 
including legislative reform to help create 
sufficient separation of the judiciary from 
other branches of state power.
The ECtHR’s order and competence 
to reinstate judges based on the violation 
of the right to a fair trial and the right to 
respect for private life found in this case 
demonstrate the scope and outreach a deci-
sion of the ECtHR potentially holds. By 
insisting upon an independent judiciary 
and fair proceedings, the Court’s decision 
can help propel necessary legal reforms 
and limit detrimental political influences. 
A politically independent national judi-
ciary is a critical tool, necessary for the 
protection of human rights in countries.
heIghted ProtectIon for chIldren 
In ImmIgratIon ProceedIngS 
affIrmed by ecthr
The European Court of Human Rights 
(EctHR) ruled in Butt v. Norway that 
the State violated the right to respect 
for private and family life protected by 
Article 8 of the European Convention 
on Human Rights (ECHR) by withdraw-
ing residence permits of two Pakistani 
siblings. The December 4, 2012, ECtHR 
decision affirmed a heightened standard of 
protection for children in immigration pro-
ceedings by expanding the possible range 
of exceptional circumstances under which 
Article 8 concerns outweigh state policy.
Siblings Johangir Abbas Butt and Fozia 
Butt received humanitarian residence 
permits from Norway in 1992. However, 
Norwegian immigration withdrew the per-
mits in 1999 because their mother failed 
to disclose that the family had returned to 
live in Pakistan from 1992 to 1996. Since 
returning, the siblings have lived intermit-
tently with their aunt and uncle, legal resi-
dents of Norway.
Article 8 of the ECHR offers general 
protection of a person’s private life, family 
life, and home from arbitrary interference 
by the state. Section 2 of Article 8 speci-
fies that public authority cannot interfere 
with this right unless it “is in accordance 
with the law and is necessary [. . .] for the 
protection of health or morals, or for the 
protection of the rights and freedoms of 
others.” Thus, relying on ECHR Article 
8 right to privacy of family life and the 
home, the siblings argued that their depor-
tation to Pakistan would break their strong 
ties with Norway where they had lived 
since childhood. They argued further that 
their links to Pakistan were weak since their 
mother died in 2007 and they had not been 
in contact with their father since 1996.
In similar cases in front of the ECtHR, 
the Court deferred to the state if the peti-
tioner had acted fraudulently. However, 
in Butt v. Norway the ECtHR held that 
the siblings could not be held responsible 
for the illicit conduct of their mother so 
long as they were unaware of their illegal 
status in Norway. Given these “exceptional 
circumstances,” the Court expanded its 
protection for children’s rights and held 
that, “exceptional circumstances” could 
make it necessary to put the interests of 
the children first, implying that a par-
ent might need to be granted residence 
as well. To protect children’s rights, the 
Court articulated that the child’s individual 
circumstances must be taken into account 
when deciding if a child should bear the 
negative consequences of parental action. 
In this case, given that the mother had died, 
the Court found little possibility of future 
exploitation of the immigration system. 
Furthermore, given that the children had 
strong interest in staying in Norway due to 
their strong social ties, such as their family 
and obtaining an education, the Court found 
that this satisfied the standards for “fam-
ily life” and “private life” encompassed in 
Article 8.
Thus, Butt v. Norway expanded the 
principles of previous judgments regard-
ing children’s rights protected by Article 
8 under the doctrine of “exceptional cir-
cumstances” under which the rights of the 
individual rise above those of the state’s 
immigration policy needs. In this case, the 
Court has created a new exception under 
“exceptional circumstances” for the pro-
tection of children even when a parent acts 
fraudulently in immigration proceedings. 
Because culpability cannot begin before 
a child gains knowledge, States must now 
consider their age and mental awareness 
of their immigration status. In essence, the 
Court has recognized that under Article 8 
children cannot be legally responsible or 
deported based solely on the mistakes of 
their parents.
Future cases will prove whether the 
Court will fully embraces the high stan-
dard of the Butt case and acknowledge the 
relevance of ties with the receiving State 
as well as the children’s lack of knowledge 
about their precarious residency status. 
Although the essential object of Article 8 
of the ECHR is to protect the individual 
against arbitrary action by public authori-
ties, Article 8 implies positive obligations 
inherent in effective “respect” for fam-
ily life, particularly in immigration and 
asylum issues. This case suggests that 
this positive obligation requires States to 
pay closer attention to exceptional cir-
cumstance factors such as the extent to 
which family life is effectively ruptured, 
the extent of the child’s ties in the contract-
ing State, whether there are insurmount-
able obstacles in the way of the family 
living in the country of origin, and whether 
there are factors of immigration control or 
considerations of public order weighing in 
favor of a child.
Antonia Latsch, an L.L.M. candidate 
at the American University Washington 
College of Law, is a staff writer for the 
Human Rights Brief.
Inter-amerIcan SyStem
Inter-amerIcan court of human 
rIghtS ruleS agaInSt coSta 
rIca’S abSolute ban on In-VItro 
fertIlIzatIon
In a case touching on the right to 
life of an embryo, the Inter-American 
Court of Human Rights (IACtHR) ruled in 
November 2012 that an absolute ban of in-
vitro fertilization (IVF) violates the right 
to privacy, the right to family, and the right 
to personal integrity. In 2000, Costa Rica 
became the first country to pass a total ban 
on IVF, citing a concern for the right to life 
contained in the Costa Rican Constitution 
and the American Convention on Human 
Rights. In response, nine infertile couples 
brought a petition against Costa Rica to the 
Inter-American Commission on Human 
Rights (IACHR). The case, Murillo et 
al. v. Costa Rica, was transferred to the 
IACtHR, which agreed with the petition-
ers and the Commission that the absolute 
ban on the use of IVF procedures violates 
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the rights to privacy, to family, and to per-
sonal integrity. In addition, the IACtHR 
interpreted the meaning of the right to 
life provision contained in the American 
Convention by clarifying that the right to 
life does not stand alone and independent 
of other rights.
In 1995, Costa Rica’s Ministry of 
Health authorized the use of IVF and 
between 1995 and 2000 fifteen babies were 
born through the procedure. In response to 
IVF’s authorization, a petitioner filed a 
claim alleging that the use of IVF was 
unconstitutional. In 2000, Costa Rica’s 
Supreme Court held that IVF violated the 
right to life and human dignity provisions of 
the country’s constitution, and also Article 4 
(right to life) of the American Convention. 
The country’s highest court held that life 
begins at conception and thus any inten-
tional or accidental discarding or mishan-
dling of embryos violated the right to life.
Article 4 of the American Convention 
states: “Every person has the right to 
have his life respected. This right shall be 
protected by law and, in general, from the 
moment of conception. No one shall be 
arbitrarily deprived of his life.” However, 
until now, the “moment of conception” 
language has been undefined. In decid-
ing on the Costa Rican case, the IACtHR 
noted its status as the ultimate interpreta-
tive authority on the American Convention 
and ruled that personal integrity, personal 
liberty, privacy, and right to a family out-
weighed some of the nuanced interpreta-
tions offered by Costa Rica on the reach 
of the right to life provision. In particular, 
the Court focused on the right of couples 
to start a family (Article 17) and the right 
to privacy (Article 11). The Court noted 
that both provisions touch on reproductive 
health and access to necessary technolo-
gies in order to have children.
The Court did not shy away from 
Article 4 and the right to life but made a 
careful analysis as to the interpretation of 
the words “in general” and “conception.” In 
describing the IVF procedure, the IACtHR 
noted that scientific literature talks about 
two distinct moments, implantation and 
fertilization, and reasoned that only upon 
completing the cycle of fertilization can 
conception exist. The Court interpreted 
this to mean that if fertilization is required 
for formation of the zygote (the fertil-
ized egg created from the union of ovum 
and sperm), then non-implanted embryos 
could never realize their full development 
and thus the Court determined that the 
rights of those embryos are null. Therefore, 
the Court held, conception cannot occur 
before implantation and the right to life 
protections cannot apply to non-implanted 
embryos. The Court reasoned that the “in 
general” wording allowed for this interpre-
tation. Accordingly, the IACtHR held that 
Costa Rica’s Supreme Court failed to con-
sider other rights affected by an absolute 
ban on IVF, which resulted in an arbitrary 
and excessive intrusion into private and 
family life, with disproportionate impacts 
on certain groups; as a result, the interfer-
ence had a discriminatory impact.
The Court also agreed with the peti-
tioners that the absolute ban unfairly dis-
criminated against poorer families due to the 
prohibitive cost of travel for couples without 
financial means. The Court added that the 
ban had a particular discriminatory effect on 
women who were already undergoing IVF 
treatment when the ban was instituted.
The decision could have important 
impacts throughout the Americas region 
because the Court’s decisions are bind-
ing on all countries that have ratified 
the Court’s contentious jurisdiction. Since 
announcing that the Court’s decision was 
forthcoming, both sides have presented 
arguments as to whether Article 4’s right 
to life provision begins at conception and 
includes embryos. Some argued that if 
the Court ruled in favor of the petitioners, 
then the decision would open the door for 
changes to laws concerning contraception, 
abortion laws, and research on humans.
Among the reparations ordered by 
the Court are that Costa Rica re-institute 
access to IVF, offer counseling to plain-
tiffs, and slowly incorporate access to IVF 
into its health system through its social 
security programs. Costa Rica has said it 
will comply with the Court’s decision and 
allow in-vitro fertilization again.
Inter-amerIcan commISSIon 
IncreaSIngly requeStIng 
PrecautIonary meaSureS for cuba
A disproportionate number of requests 
for precautionary measures granted by the 
Inter-American Commission on Human 
Rights (IACHR) in 2012 were for Cuban 
citizens. Of the 26 total precautionary 
measures requested by the Commission, 
five were focused on the island nation. The 
requested measures focused primarily on 
the protection of human rights defenders 
and the situation inside Cuba’s prisons.
Precautionary measures and annual 
reports represent the limited options 
available to the Inter-American System 
of Human Rights (IASHR) to engage 
with Cuba. In 1962 the Organization of 
American States (OAS) excluded Cuba 
from participating due to its Marxist-
leaning government, which the OAS cited 
as “incompatible with the principles and 
objectives of the Inter-American System.” 
In 2009, the OAS reopened lines of com-
munication with Cuba but left it to Cuba 
to initiate dialogue. Thus, until and when 
Cuba decides to strengthen its relationship 
and discourse with the OAS structure, the 
IASHR has limited reach in its enforcement 
of human rights in Cuba. However, Article 
23 of the IACHR Rules of Procedure states 
that anyone legally recognized by an OAS 
Member State may bring a petition to the 
Commission and ask that the American 
Declaration on the Rights and Duties of 
Man apply. Furthermore, Article 51 of the 
Rules establishes that the Commission may 
examine any petition of alleged violations 
in light of the American Declaration for 
states that are not a party to the American 
Convention. Cuba is not a signatory to the 
American Convention on Human Rights, 
but the general principles and custom-
ary international norms enshrined in the 
American Declaration may be applied 
to Cuba due to their OAS membership. 
Hence, requests for precautionary mea-
sures and annual reports remain available 
through the Commission.
The Commission is the first entrance 
into the IASHR, and where a party believes 
that protective interim measures are neces-
sary to prevent irreparable harm, they may 
request that the Commission encourage a 
state to adopt precautionary measures so 
as to protect people or subject matter of a 
pending case. Since 2010, there has been 
an increase in the number of precautionary 
measures the Commission has urged Cuba 
to adopt. Other countries, such as Mexico 
and Colombia, are consistently on the list 
of most precautionary measures requested, 
but Cuba’s presence has increased from 
only two granted requests in 2010 to four 
granted precautionary measures in 2011 
and five in 2012. This increase may, in 
part, relate to Cuba’s recent re-introduction 
into the IASHR.
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From 2010 to 2012, requests for pre-
cautionary measures centered on two key 
topics: treatment inside Cuba’s prison sys-
tem and protection against discrimination 
based on one’s political thoughts and asso-
ciations. The Commission’s most recent 
2011 annual report included a chapter on 
Cuba in which the Commission exten-
sively discussed the situation for human 
rights defenders and political dissidents in 
Cuba; imprisonment was addressed only as 
related to those issues.
In all cases, the Commission requested 
that Cuba reach an agreement with the 
beneficiary of the precautionary measures 
and report back to the Commission on 
progress toward investigating facts and 
protecting the person involved. Notably, 
the Commission itself generally makes 
clear that issuance of a precautionary 
measure does not prejudge that a human 
rights violation has occurred. In the past, 
Cuba has acted on some of the precaution-
ary measure requests, such as the release 
of an epileptic woman from prison, while 
others have gone unanswered, such as the 
continued imprisonment of political dissi-
dent Sonia Garro. Cuba’s response to more 
recent requests is unknown.
Debate exists as to the legitimacy of 
the Commission’s use of interim measures. 
Article 63 of the American Convention 
expressly dictates that the Inter-American 
Court of Human Rights (IACtHR) has the 
power to issue provisional measures in cases 
of extreme gravity and urgency. However, 
the Convention makes no corresponding 
reference regarding the Commission’s 
ability to issue interim measures. Yet, 
under Article 25 of the Commission’s 
own governing Rules of Procedure, the 
Commission has established that it too 
has the power to issue interim measures 
to protect against irreparable harm. The 
Commission derives this power from the 
its duty to ensure compliance with state’s 
commitments, outlined in Article 18 of the 
Commission’s Statute, and also based on 
the Commission’s functions as outlined in 
Article 41 of the American Convention.
Jessica Alatorre, a J.D. candidate at the 
American University Washington College 
of Law, is a staff writer for the Human 
Rights Brief.
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